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Global Tangles: Laws,
Headcoverings and
Religious Identity
Seval Yildirim

Although contemporary international human rights law is centered upon individual
dignity and liberation, it increasingly accepts and even seeks State control of human conduct,
albeit to provide protection to those it deems weak. Increasing control of the human
individual’s physical being, the body, is part of this increasing control. From identifying the
human individual in various ways to demanding that the State take charge of regulating her
conduct, the liberationist ideal of human rights discourse has born a State increasingly
regulatory and punitive.
Whether one finds liberty under a headcover or finds oppression because of it, current
discourses seeking to explain and understand why a woman might cover her hair, or why
Islam might involve covered hair, or why a woman could never willingly choose to cover her
hair, all miss the most troubling part about laws that either mandate or prohibit
headcoverings. From a human rights perspective, the most troublesome aspect of all these
laws is that they regulate the female body, and regulate it in the name of grand narratives
such as religion, national identity and perhaps the most troublesome, in the name of women’s
rights and gender equality.
Few, if any, parts of the human body have been more politicized and its regulation more
legitimized in the name of human rights than the Muslim woman’s hair. Since the late
nineteenth century Muslim women’s hair has been at the center of discourses surrounding
secularism and modernity in the Middle East, in the midst of formulations of national
identity in a number of Muslim-majority contexts (such as Turkey and Egypt), a focus of
colonialist discourses, a point of justification for feminist projects, just to name a few. Muslim
woman’s hair is said to constitute a religion’s symbol of freedom and a threat to democracy
when covered, or a nation’s identity and a symbol for women’s rights when revealed. Despite
the fact that Muslim women are not alone in covering themselves for religious belief, they
have been the subjects of socio-politico-legal discourse and State regulation more than any of
their counterparts.1

1.

For example, various sects of Christianity and Judaism also believe that women must dress
modestly and many practicing female adherents cover their hair. In other parts of the world, such as
parts of India, non-Muslim women cover their hair to follow tradition and local custom.
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This paper inquires why Muslim women have received this special attention by
questioning certain propositions posed as truisms in the discourses surrounding hijab.2 This
paper is about international law’s inadequacy to meaningfully comprehend and address the
complexity of the issues Muslim covering women face in liberal democracies. Women in
question are those who dare to cover their hair out of piety and seek to participate in public
space in liberal democracies. To quote Foucault, they are those who “upset[] established laws
and somehow anticipate[] the coming freedom.”3 This paper is also about the complexity and
the simultaneous banality of the discourses surrounding the Muslim woman’s hair and
liberal-ideology-born international law’s inherent and proven inadequacy in dealing with the
challenge posed by the covered Muslim woman’s hair in what is referred to, in liberal jargon,
as public space. The visibility of a woman’s hair is one of those universal concerns that have
gone beyond temporality, contextuality, locality, and ideology. Whether in an effort to make a
woman’s hair visible or to hide it from others’ gaze, woman’s hair has been a political,
religious, and legal focus of various discourses for at least the last two centuries.
Because political movements have made a cause of Muslim women’s hair, and because
people have mobilized around what to do with it, many scholars have written volumes on the
subject. Some have found oppression in head coverings, applauding laws that prohibit them,
claiming to speak in the name of women’s rights. Others have explained the reasons why
women might choose to cover their hair for religion, emphasizing choice, and religious
freedom and individual liberty. Yet others have explained that Islam is a religion of
liberation, that its revelation improved women’s condition in its place of reception in the
Arabian Peninsula. The Bush administration made the burqas of Afghani women one of the
central pieces of its military projects in Afghanistan and even in Iraq. Yet others wrote about
the various methods of interpreting Islamic legal sources so as to emphasize that Islam does
not necessitate head coverings, but simply modesty. And in response, others objected and
demanded that Muslim women must cover their hair. From self-acclaimed feminists and
human rights activists to self-acclaimed experts on Islam and Muslims, many have offered an
opinion on the matter. From oppression to liberation, woman’s hair is very much the political
powder keg, increasingly fueled and lit by laws passed and enforced by the State in various
contexts.
Headcovering-prohibitive laws invariably do so in the name of women’s rights and a range
of liberationist ideologies (individual freedoms, right of the public to be free from religious
coercion trumping individual women’s religious rights, etc.). This paper seeks to focus on this
paradox—prohibiting an act that poses no discernable harm to the individual or others in

2.
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Muslim women’s headcoverings vary based on location, belief, and sect, among other variables. In
this paper I use the term hijab to refer to a wide variety of these headcoverings. In the Turkish case,
I use the term headscarf as the debates revolve primarily around a piece of scarf tied around the
head and the neck. To refer to clothing that cover the entire body and the face, I use the term veil.
See generally FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE (1999); see also Heather
Marie Akou, Building a New World Fashion: Islamic Dress in the 21st Century, 11 FASHION THEORY
403, 403-21 (2007), for further discussion on the variety of Muslim hair and body coverings and the
various terms used in different contexts to refer to them.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Random House Inc. trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990)
(1976).
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society in the name of liberal democratic principles of individual freedom and feminist
consciousness.
Today the Muslim woman is faced with the absurd reality where she is the subject of laws
and regulations that either mandate her to cover her body in specific ways, or to uncover her
hair in order to participate in public space. This absurdity is a product of at least three
historical occurrences. First, it is an extension of Orientalist discourses produced in the last
few centuries in order to create a distinct and superior Western Christian identity and to
justify colonialist projects. Second, this absurdity is a product of the dominant feminist
narratives in international human rights discourses, where the only liberated woman is one
that rejects tradition and religion. Third, the evolving and escalating nature of the absurdity
faced by the covered Muslim woman is fueled by the post-9/11 discourses that have made a
questionable subject of Islam and Muslims in need of moderation and reform to comply with
international law and international human rights. In this post-9/11 context, two primary
personas have emerged as representative of things Islamic and Muslim: the Muslim terrorist
man that needs to be identified and eliminated, and the oppressed covered Muslim woman
that needs to be woken up, saved and, if she refuses, removed from public space. This paper
focuses primarily on the latter two occurrences, concluding with a review of the recent
jurisprudence from Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights.
In Part I, I argue that covered hair must be viewed in light of the power-dynamics
surrounding international and various national politics. Although identity politics
surrounding covered hair, or the covered Muslim woman, are especially stark since the events
of 9/11, the discourses that led to the distinct persona of the covered Muslim woman can be
traced back to an earlier era of European colonialism, images of the savage Oriental
(referring in this context to its original meaning covering the Ottoman Empire, extending to
Africa and South Asia). To make this point, I borrow from Michele Foucault the idea that
power operates not in a top down manner but through discourse4 and various personas are
constructed through discourse, not despite the resistance of those whose identities are
formed, but through their participation in the origination discourses. Similar to Foucault’s
analysis regarding sexual identities, I argue that the covered Muslim woman as a distinct
persona emerged as a result of the Orientalist discourses in the 18th and 19th centuries, which
discourses were accepted, honed and adopted by the nation-building elites in a number of
countries in the Middle East, and elsewhere in Muslim-majority contexts. What is
additionally triggered is an inquiry about the purpose of founding laws in the inception of a
nation. I argue that the nation-building elite in these countries viewed law as an instrument
of power, and as a tool to shape the new society in the image of what they perceived to be
civilization, or in their imaginary, Christian Western Europe where women’s hair remained
visible. Further, as a result of the accepted and (through new laws) enforced norm of the
revealed hair, the covered Muslim woman was rendered a member of the periphery of the
social order. Those on the periphery are the ones whose identities are most starkly
formulated, discussed and are the subject of discourse. I argue that this peripheral

4.

Id.
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positioning of the covered Muslim woman meant that she would remain at the center of
debates about national identity, progress, liberation, uniformity, and conformity to power.
In Part II, I turn to the development of what I have elsewhere referred to as the post-9/11
epistemological terrain,5 wherein the covered Muslim woman has emerged as a primary
representative of Islam and Muslims, and the focus of curiosity and inquiry. In my discussion
of hijab-prohibitive laws, I focus primarily on Turkey, as it most starkly demonstrates that
identification with a country’s demographic majority (Muslim) might not prevent one (haircovered Muslim woman) from being forced to the periphery of socio-political formation. I
discuss the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC), which has consistently
blocked every legislative effort to lift the headscarf ban in higher educational institutions
since the 1980’s. The Turkish covered woman as a persona emerges as the product of
discourses surrounding what it means to be a liberated woman, a feminist, a female citizen of
a civilized or modern nation, almost solely responsible for the survival of the secular politicolegal nature of the State.
In Part III, I argue that from its legal documents to court decisions, international human
rights discourse is inadequate to comprehend and deal with the complexity of identity so as to
provide adequate protection to the covered Muslim woman. I focus on the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and particularly the case of Sahin v. Turkey,
where the ECHR held that although Turkey was in violation of freedom of conscience, the
breach was justified in Turkey’s attempt to battle Islamic fundamentalism and maintain a
secular state.
In conclusion, I emphasize the need to approach the headscarf discourse from a critical
place questioning power, its covert and overt mechanisms of politics, law and even military
might. The cases from TCC and the ECHR are strikingly similar in their reasoning that the
Muslim woman’s hair lies at the heart of the struggle against those elements seeking to
overthrow secular states, and worse, Islamic fundamentalist forces leading to international
terrorism. A few concepts recur in both courts’ jurisprudence upholding prohibition:
neutrality, public vs. private space (wherein religion and its overt exercise is regulated in
public space in the name of public good), individual rights, rights of the few vs. public good or
public interest in maintaining a secular (synonymously used as the most free) space and
state. I conclude that the international human rights discourse has been unable to address
the complexity of the headscarf disputes mainly because it reflects a very liberal bias, as well
as a Western European and North American contextual bias—in other words, the legal
mechanisms through which international human rights are defined, articulated and in turn
protected or rejected today in international law is very much the product of flawed
mechanisms that have at times led to the prohibition of headscarves in various countries
around the world, whose domestic legal structures are founded on liberal democratic
principles of inescapable difference, inescapable identity that places individuals in categories,
and the very concept of equality which is necessarily based on inherent differences.

5.
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See Seval Yildirim, Discussing Islam in the Post-9/11 Epistemological Terrain, 19 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 223 (2007).
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Part I: Questioning International Human Rights Discourse
Contemporary international human rights discourses are based on a few primary
presumptions. The first presumption is that liberal democratic ordering of society is the just
order and if applied fully across society, it produces the most just society with the most
equitable outcomes, given the potential difficulties of pluralistic societies. Second, gender
equality is an inherent aspect of contemporary international human rights discourse, where
gender and gender injustice can be defined in global terms. In other words, women around
the world can be considered one indivisible group, historically silenced and oppressed by men.
Thus, the solution offered by international human rights discourse must be global: men and
women are equal, and the State and the law cannot support or uphold conduct that
contradicts this equality. Certain conduct (like covering hair) is in turn understood to be
oppressive and demeaning to women, and must therefore be prohibited so that it can
eventually be eradicated.6 Third, covering certain parts of a woman’s body is acceptable, while
socio-cultural and religious and legal systems demanding that women cover their hair are
oppressive and unacceptable in secular democracies upholding values of gender equality. A
woman with covered hair cannot be a woman equal, whereas demanding that women uncover
other parts of their bodies (such as their chest) would be coercive, violent and unacceptable in
a liberal democratic society valuing gender equality.
Law, with all its variables and various bodies, from legislatures to courts to law
enforcement agents, defines and recognizes its objects through identity. In other words, each
subject, or each citizen, is assigned an identity, no matter how imaginary or unstable. The
very basic of these identities is the individual or the individual citizen within the jurisdiction
of the law. Then the law creates layers of identity for the individual citizen.7 Religion is one of
those identities. In liberal democratic legal systems, including international law, it is based
on these identities that egalitarianism is achieved: equality is measured by looking to see
whether individuals with their various identities are equal to others in society. Identity is
about being distinguished as either belonging to a group or as the other, the outsider. In other
words, “identity itself only makes sense in juxtaposition with alterity.”8 In essence, every
belonging is also an exclusion.

6.

7.

8.

Recognizing that cultural relativist arguments are often triggered in order to subjugate not just
women but entire populations, my goal here, or anywhere in the paper, is not to engage in a cultural
relativist critique of universal values. Rather, I want to point out that the international human
rights discourse has inherent assumptions that are not always sustainable when the facts on the
ground are considered. Hijab and other lived experiences of Muslim women, especially in nonMuslim-majority contexts, prove the difficulty of sustaining rigid feminist presumptions about the
universality of female subjugation. There are certainly contexts and instances where Muslim
women and girls are forced to cover their hair by their families and communities. However, that
coercion exists in some cases cannot render every instance of the covering the result of coercion. Nor
does the reality of coercion in some cases and contexts justify State mandated coercion to uncover
hair.
Although there is invaluable critical scholarship on intersectionality of various identities, here I
mean something different. Whereas intersectionality speaks of an individual with various identities,
I question the very reality of identity rather than seek to recognize the varieties, overlap and
interconnectedness of various identities of an individual.
IRVIN C. SCHICK, THE EROTIC MARGIN: SEXUALITY AND SPATIALITY IN ALTERITIST DISCOURSE 21
(1999).

49

10 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (2012)

Yet identity, including religious identity, is not produced through a top-down process but
rather is produced and reproduced through the workings of Power over time, space and
context. Contemporary international human rights discourse takes a flawed approach to
understanding Power, and consequently fails to recognize the complexity of workings of
Power, of identity as a politico-legal reality, of specific identities, of the limits and the
capabilities of the Law as the instrument of State Power, and agency and contribution of
those it deems oppressed in the workings of Power and identity formation.
Contemporary international human rights discourse has identified certain personas as
those whose rights have been historically and systematically violated, and in need of
international protection. To fulfill the project of saviorship, international human rights
documents are framed around the protection of those identified as victims. Women, as an
identifiable, globally unified group constitute one of these personas. The general tone of
international human rights documents do not target erasing “gender” as a category of
identification, but rather highlight that there is an inherent gender binary as part of the
human reality (male and female) and women must be protected. For instance, Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women crystallizes this approach.
These conventions, and the body of international law produced from decisions made by
utilizing these conventions, reflect a very specific feminist position which identifies an
inherent gender binary (female and male), presumes that invariably and universally men
dominate women, and that any human rights effort must begin from these presumptions and
stand to save the oppressed woman.9 Janet Halley refers to this feminism as governance
feminism.10 Halley argues that governance feminism has won many battles, such as in
workplace sex discrimination and custody laws, and that in certain contexts it is no longer a
male narrative that governs but rather women have the dominant authority. Moreover,
governance feminism has utilized state apparatuses to achieve its goals through legislation,
case law and enforced punishments.11
According to governance feminism, framed by Catherine MacKinnon, among other
scholars and juridical bodies, male domination is in every aspect of everyday life, from the
way individuals view themselves as men and women, to various state structures including
modes of governance and laws. Accordingly, power is male and its workings invariably benefit
men to the detriment of women. Women are oppressed by and suffer at the hands of male
laws, male religions, male jurisprudence, and generally male-defined social norms.
International law is no different, and it at best falls short of recognizing and meeting the need
to disrupt and destroy male dominance. In this view, women as a global collective identity
have a reality that is silent because silenced, unheard because subjugated, lived in similar
patterns because similarly oppressed by systems in nature male, and unseen because only the
silenced women themselves can access this reality. Although discontent with the maleness of
Law, governance feminism wants to utilize law to undo male dominance and improve

9.
10.
11.
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See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DIALOGUES (2007).
See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
(2006).
Id.
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women’s status globally. To this end, governance feminism has argued to change the law to
include punishments for male misconduct and female complicity.
Governance feminism is a totalizing ideology—both because it assumes totality of male
dominance, rejecting the possibility of female choices and spaces and meaning, and because it
assumes all women are the same and want and desire the same things. Thus subjugation and
liberation from it are common causes for all women. For instance, in a speech she delivered in
Istanbul, the Egyptian feminist Nawal al-Saadawi said, “They are not interested in our hair.
They want to blind us, blind our minds. That is why our slogan is ‘to lift the veil on our
minds.’”12
Saadawi’s words imply that there is a male conspiracy to imprison women in ignorance, to
trap minds under headscarves and veils, and to trap sexuality under long coats. The
sentiment behind these words also implies that women, collectively, oppose covering their
hair out of religious conviction. It further agrees with the male-centric view that religion is
the man’s domain and women have no place there. In this view, women and religion exist in
different spheres at best, and in opposing spheres at worst. To the extent that male
oppression of women is identified, dismantling it may, and perhaps must, employ laws that
prohibit any resemblance of women’s acceptance of male oppression. In other words, the
feminist project is comfortable with governance, and with State imposition of new
(presumably woman liberationist) norms, including, and perhaps primarily that of revealing
Muslim woman’s hair.
It is this governance feminism that international law and its human rights
conceptualizations are plagued with today. Although governance feminism has benefited
women in certain instances (such as the marital last name laws in Turkey),13 there is an
urgent need to heed Janet Halley’s call to take a break from this feminism in international
law and hear the voices of covered Muslim women whose voices have been silenced by
governance feminism. Liberal conceptualizations of identity coupled with the rigidity and
blind fervor of governance, feminism has led to not only various national laws prohibiting
women’s headcoverings in public space, but they have also led to ECHR decisions upholding
such prohibitive laws.
When thinking about hijab prohibitive laws, taking a break from governance feminism
and international law’s acceptance of it would create the possibility of perceiving the religious
covered Muslim woman as an intelligent, self-aware agent making meaningful choices about
her body. Moreover, it would allow for the recognition that not all women are the same or
even similar and that not all women experience oppression and subjugation in the same or
even similar ways. Finally, it would allow for the possibility that sometimes some women’s
oppression and subjugation as women might be the product of governance feminism. This is
not to suggest that feminism is never necessary or useful. Rather, a feminism that always
presumes women must look and act alike to be gender equal, applies universal norms born of

12.
13.

Nawal al-Saadawi, Arap Kadinlari ve Siyaset Uzerine Dusunceler (Thoughts on Arab Women and
Politics), KADINLAR VE SIYASAL YASAM (WOMEN AND POLITICAL LIFE), 143-151 (1991).
See Unal Tekeli v. Turkey, App. No. 29865/96 (2004) (holding law mandating that Turkish women
had to take their husbands’ last names (at least in hyphenated form) violated gender equality).
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specific (European) contexts to all women globally, and a feminism that employs State
punitive mechanisms is not always good for all women, and at times might even be harmful
to some. When feminism turns into State paternalism and State violence through prohibitive
laws, then it could only benefit women to take a break from feminism.

The Truth about Hair
In order to appreciate the complexity, and yet the offensive banality, of the discourses
surrounding Muslim woman’s hair, it is necessary to talk about habit—habitual acceptance of
what has become truth. Not because of any established proof or an objective set of facts
establishing a reality which we could refer to as truth, but rather a set of propositions,
emotional conclusions, derivatives of fear-ridden illogic and normative conduct as a result of
the workings of Power. To that end, the controversies over Muslim headcoverings constitute a
moment of different regimes of Truth trying to establish hold over the Muslim woman’s body.
On the one hand, traditional interpretations of Islamic law mandate that a woman’s hair
be concealed in the name of modesty so as to maintain social order, constantly at risk from
the sexual urges of human beings. On the other, Western ideological norms mandate that it
be revealed in the name of human rights, women’s rights and public good.14 How this regime
of truth has placed Muslim woman’s hair in the midst of its very survival requires the
following points of inquiry: First, what is it about a woman’s (any woman’s) hair that
demands regulation in a systematic manner, through law, enforcement and even
punishment? In other words, why is hair different and distinct from other body parts? Second,
how has a regime of truth been established wherein freedom, liberation, meaningful choice,
and female strength is associated with revealed female hair, and oppression, subjugation,
lack of choice and weakness is associated with covered female hair? Third, how can a
woman’s headcovering be so strong a symbol of violence and terror that it must be outlawed
in certain contexts? Fourth, why is the intention of the woman covering her hair relevant to
the legitimacy of a prohibitive law? And, finally, why are laws claiming universal application,
international human rights instruments and juridical bodies unable and/or incapable of
recognizing the need to dismantle the current regulation over female hair, be it to mandate
women to cover or to reveal it?
Current debates surrounding Muslim female headcoverings in liberal democracies create a
false dichotomy whereby only covered hair is regulated. Consequently only a demand to cover
hair is oppressive, political, a potential instrument of disruptive and even violent Muslim
movements, and a general threat to the permissive environment for all that secularism
creates. As is discussed in further detail below, these presumptions are at the heart of the
arguments put forth by legislatures passing prohibitive laws, and they are accepted and
upheld by both domestic courts, and international juridical bodies, specifically the ECHR.

14.
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I recognize the problems born of using “Western” to refer to a variety of contexts, which might be
rather different from one another. However, this term remains useful to identify the development of
the liberal ideology that has impacted legal and political norm-creation not only in Northern
America and Western Europe but increasingly throughout the rest of the world, through adoption
and, at times, wholesale importation of Western European and American laws reflecting ideas of
liberal philosophy as a regime of truth.
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The responses given to these points have revolved around explanations of why the
headcovering or the body veil might be a mode of safety for some women, explaining the
return to veiling practices, or they have focused on liberal democratic values such as freedom
of conscience, freedom of belief and exercise, and equal protection of the laws. Other
responses have focused on refuting arguments that most, if not all, Muslim women and girls
are forced to cover their hair and/or bodies, and have emphasized stories of Muslim women
willingly covering their hair while maintaining notable professional careers.
These arguments fail to recognize that they are essentially different faces of the same coin,
and none of the arguments question the existence of the coin in the first place. For instance,
what would an alternative reality look like where the norm is covered hair and revealed hair
is the deviation from the norm? In Foucault’s terms, what if the regime of truth was such that
revealed hair seemed burdensome on women, and was perceived as an international human
rights problem, which could even be used to justify military operations? Today, the covered
Muslim woman in secular democracies is a peripheral identity whose self-awareness and selfesteem is presumed to be lacking, whose choices are presumed to be compromised by
complicity in patriarchal religious systems, whose intelligence is questioned, and whose
loyalty to global sisterhood for liberation is presumed non-existent. Given that religious
Muslims in secular democracies already constitute peripheral identities, covered women are
often on the periphery of the periphery of society.15 The current discourse regarding hijab
overlooks the complex historical, social, and even religious meaning that may be attached to
covered hair or body.
In secular democratic contexts with hijab prohibitive laws, the courts have failed to
recognize these complexities attached to the hijab. The courts and legislatures have chosen to
remain ignorant about discourses that have questioned conventional wisdom about the hijab.
For instance, Leila Ahmed has pointed out that hijab evolved as a symbol of resistance to
colonialism in 19th century Egypt,16 while Joan Wallach Scott has written about the racist
and xenophobic conceptualizations of Islam and hijab in the French context.17 Recognizing
the possibility of covered hair, as not necessarily gender oppression, but an instance of
resistance and self-distinction, would transform the discourse on hijab in secular
democracies. Such recognition would create new dimensions of thinking about human dignity
that goes beyond gender equality guaranteed through punitive measures and religious
freedom gained by totalizing understandings of what each religion must mean to all its
adherents.

Part II
Admittedly, simply talking about the norm and deviation only immediately explains those
contexts where the Muslim woman is a member of the minority group, i.e., a context where

15.

16.
17.

See Seval Yildirim, The Search for Shared Idioms: Contesting Views of Laiklik Before the Turkish
Constitutional Court, in MUSLIM SOCIETIES AND THE CHALLENGE OF SECULARIZATION: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 235 (Gabriele Marranci ed., 2010) (arguing that religious Muslims in
Turkey constitute a peripheral identity).
LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF A MODERN DEBATE (1992).
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007).
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Muslims are a religious minority. If that is so, how do prohibitive Muslim-majority contexts
fit into the global picture? Hijab prohibitive laws also exist in Muslim-majority countries such
as Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan, all with differing forms and degrees of
liberal democratic political systems.

Hijab Prohibitive Laws: The Case of Turkey
One point highlighted by the current headscarf discourses is worth repeating: not all
Muslim women cover for the same reasons, nor do they cover in the same manner. Context
and subtext matter. Perhaps a rather stark absurdity in the prohibitions on headscarves is
the set of laws and political battles in Muslim-majority contexts. Since the 1980’s, Turkey has
promulgated regulations and laws that prohibit headscarves in public education institutions
and government offices. Various laws have been enforced with varying degrees of strictness,
but the debate continues to this day. Interestingly, the primary case from the ECHR, Sahin v.
Turkey, which upholds prohibitive laws, concerns the Turkish ban.18 While it might be easier
to analyze the prohibitive laws in Western European countries like France and Belgium by
references to xenophobia and racism, the Turkish case presents a more complex picture.
The majority of Turkey’s population is Muslim.19 According to a 2006 study, approximately
half of Turkish women cover their hair in various forms, albeit in greater numbers in rural
areas.20 This alone does not indicate the exact number of women subject to prohibitive laws,
as many Turkish women of older generations cover their hair out of tradition, and also out of
tradition, they do not seek careers outside the home.21 As the subsequent brief historical
survey of Turkey’s hijab debates indicates, the prohibitive laws in public space coincide with
socio-political mobility, and urbanization, bringing traditional women (among other groups)
into the public space (including universities and public offices) specifically. Hakan Yavuz
argues that although shifts in Turkish socio-political mobility can be traced as far back as the
1960’s, the major transformative shift occurred following the 1980 military coup.22 This
transformative shift in turn led to “the new liberal political opening conceded by the
secularist state and the subsequent appropriation of these new opportunity spaces by
Islamist groups and intellectuals.”23 In other words, a Muslim woman’s demand to cover her
hair while participating in public space in a secular liberal democracy is very much a product
of modernity and the socio-political space created by secular liberal democratic ideals.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
Official records include all who are born to Muslim-identified parents, as well as Bahais. See
generally Yildirim, supra note 15, for a critique of official records including individuals who do not
identify as Muslim.
ALI CARKOGLU & BINNAZ TOPRAK, DEGISEN TURKIYE’DE DIN, TOPLUM VE SIYASET 58 (2006).
See generally ELISABETH ÖZDALGA, THE VEILING ISSUE, OFFICIAL SECULARISM AND POPULAR ISLAM
IN MODERN TURKEY (1998), for a study of different types of headcoverings in Turkish contexts,
including the countryside.
M.H. YAVUZ, ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY 8 (2003).
Id.
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Before the Republic
Regulation of women’s hair predates the current debates, and even certain systematic
dissemination of Islamophobic rhetoric about Islam’s inherent mistreatment of women in a
way distinct from other religions and other legal systems. Since the 19th century, with the
dissemination of Western European liberalism in Middle Eastern contexts, including Egypt,
Turkey and Iran, Western perceptions of what covered hair meant was introduced to the
Middle East intellectual discourse.24
For instance, in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s predecessor, covered hair had been the
norm for decades until the increasing influence of European ideas of what constitutes
civilized and modern began shaping the image of what the new Turkish woman should look
like. Muslim women generally have been subjects of societies accepting male interpretations
of Islam, followed by Orientalist conceptions of “the Oriental woman.” Ironically, the
Orientalist view differed only slightly from the Islamic one. Islamic jurisprudence primarily
discussed woman as a purely sexual being, whose actions were controlled by her
unquenchable sex drive. According to this understanding, man had to control her sexuality if
he were to run an efficient society. In other words, woman’s sexuality uncontrolled would
destroy society.25
The Orientalist view of “the Oriental woman” developed along similar lines. The Oriental
woman was an irresistible beauty with animal-like sexuality. She was described as “both
repulsive and alluring, crude and refined, disgustingly filthy and obsessed with bathing,
unspeakably ugly and fabulously beautiful, ragged and elegant, shapeless and perfectly
proportioned . . . a wily manipulator and a helpless prisoner, a scheming evil-doer and
innocent as a child.”26
Just like the Islamic jurisprudential conception of female sexuality, the Orientalist
account saw “the Oriental woman” as a purely sexual being. Whatever limited mental
capacity she had, she used it to further her needs based mainly on her sexuality. At the same
time, “the Oriental woman” knew how to use her sexuality to get what she wanted and men
were almost slaves to her sexual powers. Thus, “the Oriental woman” or the Muslim woman
presented a danger to society in that her uncontrolled sexuality could lead to chaos.

The Turkish Republic and the Kemalist Reforms
Orientalist and Islamic theological views of the Muslim woman originated from different
sources and served distinct purposes—justification for political moves, such as colonialism,
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and theological jurisprudence, respectively. Their end results, however, were similar when it
came to the nation-building process.
In Turkey, the nation-building elite consisted of Ottomans who were fluent in at least one
European language, and mostly educated either in the West or in Western thought. These
men had two conceptions of Ottoman women: Islamic and Orientalist. On the one hand,
women had to be confined to the private sphere and their sexuality controlled. Yet the
Orientalist narrative claimed that the Islamic social order was backward and barbaric, and if
the Orient was to evolve in any meaningful way, it had to become European.27 For the
Turkish nation-building elite, the proof of the latter was that while the Ottoman Empire
continued to lose most of its lands, the Europeans were expanding their empires by colonizing
lands in Asia and Africa.
These elite accepted the image of the Orient offered by the Europeans. Their attitude was
most apparent in the words of Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the nationalist movement, from a
speech delivered on August 30, 1925:
In some places I see women who hide their faces and eyes by throwing a piece of fabric, a
scarf, or something like that over their heads, and when a man passes by, they turn their
backs to him or close up by sitting on the ground. What is the meaning or explanation of this
behavior? Gentlemen, would the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation assume such an
absurd and vulgar pose? This is a situation that ridicules our nation. It has to be corrected
immediately.28

These words summarized the prevailing view that women’s attire and attitude were
matters of concern among the men whose task was to redefine their nation. These words from
a man, the leader of the new nation, to other “gentlemen” symbolized how women, and
specifically their hair, were to be the fundamental building blocks of the new nation — the deIslamized, modernized, Westernized new nation. Women were the symbols of
Europeanization since women’s attire and status was a very visible sign of a difference
between the Ottoman and the European.
This, however, did not mean women no longer threatened social order with their sexuality.
On the contrary, the Kemalist elite was stuck between the Islamic idea of woman as the
source of social chaos and the Orientalist idea of “the Oriental woman” as purely sexual. With
the addition of the Orientalist perspective, not only was there a need to control female
sexuality, but now, there was also a need to control its “Oriental nature” if the Westernization
project was to succeed.
It was within this framework that the Kemalist elite embarked on reforms that would
erase the visible Islamic nature of the new Turkish Republic, and would give women political
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rights. The new republic was declared in 1923. A new parliamentary system with
representatives of the people was formed. What followed was a series of reforms aimed at
transforming the newly conceptualized Turkish society at all levels.
The Kemalist reforms “eliminated or banned institutions of Islamic influence such as the
Caliph and Islamic brotherhoods, and they placed all main Islamic institutions, including the
mosques, under government control.”29 Among the early reforms were closure of religious
courts, centers for Sufi orders, and the abolishment of religious offices of the caliphate and
sheik-al-Islam.30 Western hats and clothing were legally mandated for men,31 and the Islamic
calendar was abandoned and replaced by the Christian calendar. Moreover, a modified
version of the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic alphabet used in the Ottoman Empire.32
Reforms impacting women’s status followed. While there was no clear law on female
attire, the new state encouraged women to adopt Western style attire. Through state
propaganda, newly founded educational institutions and Mustafa Kemal’s unequivocal
statements, women were specifically encouraged to abandon any kind of veiling. In 1926, the
Swiss Civil Code was adopted as the new Turkish Civil Code with a few modifications. This
new code rendered Islamic personal laws void. Accordingly, polygamy was outlawed, and
divorce was made available to both the husband and wife on similar grounds. Marriage in
new Turkey would look very much like its European counterparts—at least on paper.33
Furthermore, women gained the right to vote and hold office in municipal elections in 1930,
and in national elections in 1934.34
Before the Kemalist reforms affecting women’s rights, there already existed a multilayered Ottoman women’s movement with some circles framing their arguments around
Islam, and others around Western liberal discourse.35 The Kemalist reforms were not
concerned with legitimizing these existing women’s movements or giving effect to their
demands. Rather, nation building meant modernizing, which in turn meant becoming
European, and women’s status was a major defining factor of being European. The Kemalist
elite, therefore, adopted only the European definition of women’s rights: women in the public
sphere, but only so far as to allow men to claim that they respected equality along liberal
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lines. This also meant women had to distance themselves from religion and the way religion
had defined them so far.
Kemalist reforms constructed and promoted an “ideal Turkish woman” as a foremost
symbol of the new nation.36 It was through this woman that the Kemalist elite hoped to find a
place for the new Turkey among Western nations. “Kemalist woman served as a bridge
between civilization and nation.”37 Unfortunately, this approach to women’s rights was
limited to legal change. Reforms were implemented and enforced by a top-down process which
meant not only that the masses lacked an overall agreement with them, but also that the
reforms never really reached their full purpose of radically transforming society.38
This is not to suggest that there was no secularization of the Turkish mind. The reforms
were accepted among the urban elite in the early Republican era.39 This social
transformation, however, came with an acceptance of values because they were European,
thus modern, and not because the masses gained an evolving awareness of gender equality.
In fact, the Kemalist reforms did not invalidate or negate the Islamic concept of the
dangerous female sexuality. There was indeed a continued acceptance of this idea. Although
the State encouraged women to enter the public sphere, the public woman was more a public
“person.”40 In other words, women were encouraged to enter the public sphere because they
were human beings like men, and were, therefore, entitled to be in the public sphere. This
right was not theirs as women, but as human beings. The new Turkish woman had to leave
her sexuality, her womanness at home, in the private sphere. The presence of uncontrolled, or
freely expressed female sexuality was still as dangerous to the social order as the earlier
Islamic arguments had suggested.41
The Kemalist reforms failed to reconstruct the prevailing gender conceptions of the day.
Even though the Kemalist elite wanted to distance the new nation from Islam and the social
concepts linked to it, they failed to recognize the necessary conceptual and epistemological
deconstruction to bring about reforms towards real gender equality.

The 1982 Constitution
Although the Turkish woman’s hair was a political issue since the initial conception of the
Turkish Republic, it became a politico-legal battleground in the era following the 1980
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military coup. The laws that define “public space” and ban all kinds of headscarves in this
public space were all passed in this era. A new constitution was written, what was religious
and private, as opposed to secular and public, were clearly defined and the State control over
religion was affirmed. The headscarf once again gained importance similar to the nationbuilding era.
In 1980, a period of political turmoil led to a military coup, led by General Kenan Evren. In
1982, a new constitution was written, while the nation was still under military regime.
Although the new constitution was affirmed by the public by a referendum, it was still the
brainchild of the military regime. The 1982 Constitution is still in effect, albeit with a number
of amendments, as discussed below.42
The Preamble to the Turkish Constitution puts clear emphasis on the secular nature of
the republic: “there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state
affairs and politics . . .” In outlining the characteristics of the Turkish Republic, Article 2
states its secular nature. Article 14 prohibits the use of any fundamental rights or freedoms
to be exercised “with the aim of . . . creating discrimination on the basis of language, race,
religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these
concepts and ideas.”43
Freedom of religion and conscience is afforded in Article 24 which states that “[a]cts of
worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do
not violate the provisions of Article 14.”44 It adds that “[e]ducation and instruction in religion
and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control,”45 and that “[n]o one shall
be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion,
in any manner whatsoever, for the purposes of personal or political influence, or for even
partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on
religious tenets.”46
In addition to these provisions, Article 174 mandates the preservation of reform laws
enacted by the Kemalist revolutionaries. Among these reforms are those on Wearing of Hats
and the Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments, which prohibits religious attire. This
law specifically applies to religious personnel wearing religious garments outside the scope of
their religious duties.47
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The Post-1980 Coup Era: Headscarf Battles between the Legislature and
the Constitutional Court
The first elections following the coup were held in November 1983. With the advent of the
center right Anavatan Party, Turkey embarked on a path to liberalization and privatization.
The elections brought a new charismatic prime minister, Turgut Ozal, who was known for his
ties to one of Turkey’s largest religious sects, the Nakshbendis.48 At the same time, the leader
of the military coup, Kenan Evren, took office as the President. Evren, like the military at
large, was a strict Kemalist, who strongly believed that the secular system set in place by the
founders of the republic had to be kept intact. He interpreted this to mean all religious
symbolism should be kept out of the public sphere.
The first clash between the two heads of state was in 1987 when Evren passed a
presidential instruction banning the use of headscarves in universities. Although the higher
education authority had passed a similar ban earlier, implementation was lax and an
increasing number of women were wearing various kinds of headscarves and veils.49 With
this presidential order, women who wanted to adopt the Islamic attire, and even men who
wanted to grow their beards, were branded “fundamentalist.”
As a response to the ban, “fundamentalists” held marches throughout Turkey.50 In 1988,
the Parliament, under Ozal’s leadership, passed a bill lifting the ban.51 Evren petitioned the
Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) arguing the law was unconstitutional for violating
secularism.52 Evren argued that at stake was the heart and soul of the Kemalist revolution
that made Turkey the modern state that it is, and emphasized that “modern dress” lay at the
heart of the Turkish state.53 Covered hair could not be reconciled with modern dress and,
consequently, with a secular society. TCC agreed. It emphasized that “[s]ecularism is the
most significant Kemalist principle.”54 Since the Preamble to the Constitution mandates
loyalty to Kemalist principles, no law could contradict the most significant of those principles.
Furthermore, TCC found that any law deriving its mandate from religious belief or religious
regulation violated secularism. Since the amendment in question allowed female students,
educators and other personnel to cover their hair on the basis of their religious belief, it was
in clear violation of the Kemalist principle of secularism.55
In late 1990, the Parliament passed another bill amending the same law as in the 1989
case. By then, Ozal was the president but the military remained the watchdog of politics and
the Kemalist system. The amendment declared freedom of clothing and attire and gave
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amnesty to those disciplinary sentences given for violating clothing and attire regulations.56
The main opposition party petitioned the Court, arguing that the law attempted to override
the Court’s previous decision on the subject, and that it violated secularism. The Court found
that since the law stated that the freedom of attire was subject to the laws in effect, and the
Court’s previous decision upheld the ban on headcoverings, the current amendment could not
render headcoverings permissible. Thus, the first part of the amendment did not violate
secularism. However, the amnesty given by the amendment could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny, and was therefore abolished.57

The Merve Kavakci Incident
After these Court decisions, there was no other legal outlet left to challenge the headscarf
ban. Following the 1996 parliamentary elections, Refah, a party popularly viewed as Islamist,
formed a coalition government with a center right party, Dogruyol. Refah was later forced out
of government under the secularist military pressure, and later dissolved by the Court.58 The
members of the dissolved party formed the Fazilet Partisi (FP), which was elected to the
Parliament in 1999.
The Turkish nation was caught off-guard with the events following the elections. For the
first time in the republic’s history, two women with headscarves were elected to the
Parliament. A herd of political and security “experts” began predicting whether these women
would remove their headscarves in the Parliament. If they did not, the herd opined, certain
measures would be taken to prevent such a “threat” to Turkish secularism. Nesrin Unal of
the right-wing nationalist Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) announced that she would
remove her headscarf in the Parliament. Merve Kavakci of Fazilet Party did not make any
statements as to where her headscarf would be when she entered the Parliament for the first
time to take the parliamentarian’s oath.
On May 2, 1999, Merve Kavakci walked into the Parliament with her headscarf on her
head. There was an immediate uproar in the Parliament. The new Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit of the social democratic Demokratik Sol Parti (SHP) jumped to the podium, in his
hand a speech about the untouchable secular character of the Turkish Republic and how the
sons and daughters of this nation would not stand by while the laws were stomped over by
those looking to bring back the dark ages. As he was shouting to be heard, a majority of the
Parliament, and all the female parliamentarians from the other parties, were continuously
punching the desks and chanting “Out, out . . . ” The Chair of the Parliament had to call a
recess, at which point Kavakci left the Parliament without taking her oath. Outside awaited
numerous women’s and secularist groups holding signs against Sharia and for women’s
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rights. The crowd held candles and shouted slogans promising never to let Sharia come back
to Turkish lands.59
Kavakci was later stripped of her Turkish citizenship for failure to report to the
government and the election commission that she held dual citizenship in Turkey and the
United States. Although she later regained her Turkish citizenship after marrying a Turkish
citizen, she could never claim her seat in the Parliament as a result of having lost her
citizenship following the election.60

AKP and the Ongoing Matter of the Headscarf
Approximately two years after the Kavakci incident, the Constitutional Court dissolved
the FP for its violations of the secular laws. Among the cited reasons was Kavakci’s attempt
to disrupt the secular order.61 Students continued to protest. Lower courts heard many cases
of objections to the law. As the 2002 elections approached, and a new party, Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)62 gained ground, the Turkish woman’s hair was once again a matter
of national concern. AKP alluded to Islam in many instances and its critics branded it an
Islamist party. On November 3, 2002, the AKP won the elections by a landslide. It became
the first party since Anavatan in the 1983 elections to be the sole governing party. In fact,
only one other party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, was elected to the Parliament, and remains
the primary opposition party to date.63
AKP remains the governing party, enjoying a majority in the Turkish Parliament and has
survived two additional national elections in 2007 and 2011. The new prime minister, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, and other male members of AKP attracted attention not only for their deeds
in the government, but also because their wives covered their hair. With former AKP
member, Abdullah Gul’s election to President in 2007, the Turkish people are currently
represented by a prime minister and a president whose wives and daughters all cover their
hair out of religious conviction.
While this reality is undeniable, the initial stages of AKP’s governance saw significant
resistance from those who saw the headcoverings of politicians’ wives as threatening to
Turkish secularism at large. For instance, less than a month after his appointment as the
Parliament Chair, Bulent Arinc and his wife, Munevver Arinc, went to a state ceremony. Ms.
Arinc wore her headscarf to the ceremony. A week later, then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer,
the former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, made a statement to express his
discomfort, “It is unnecessary to make the headscarf a matter of public debate again.”64 He
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reminded the Turkish public of the Court’s decisions on the headscarf and emphasized that
the Court had said the conclusive and the last words on the matter.65
The headscarf “issue” resurfaced with a much-anticipated reception traditionally given by
the Parliament Chair. President Sezer, the leader of the opposition party, and some military
leaders, announced that they would not attend the reception because Ms. Arinc’s attendance
was anticipated.66 In the end, Ms. Arinc did not attend the reception.67 In the Parliament
Opening Ceremony in September 2003, Ms. Arinc’s name was not included, presumably to
avoid a similar frenzy. This time, there was no boycott by the political and military leaders.68
The President’s Republic Day Ball was another event for the headscarf. President Sezer
sent two kinds of invitations: those whose wives wear the headscarf received invitations for
one, whereas those who do not cover their hair, or whose wives do not cover their hair,
received invitations for two. Among those who received invitations for one were parliament
members and judges, most of whom did not attend the ball.69 It was their turn to boycott.
After the politicians, the judges joined the fight against the headscarf in their courtrooms.
Only a week after the Presidential Ball, an Appeals Court judge, Fadil Inan, asked a
defendant to leave the courtroom because she was wearing a headscarf.70 Chief Justice of the
Appeals Court, Eraslan Ozkaya, defended Inan’s decision, arguing that the courtroom is a
public space, and therefore a space in which the headscarf cannot be tolerated.71 Within days
of this incident, two defendants entered two other courtrooms with their headscarves and
were allowed to proceed with their cases without a mention of their hair. At the same time,
however, the Ankara Bar Association issued disciplinary complaints about three lawyers for
entering the courtroom with headscarves.72
In 2008, the legislature made another attempt to lift the hijab ban in universities. Law No.
5735, Section 2 stated that “No person shall be deprived of his/her right to higher education
except for reasons explicitly stated in law. The parameters of this right [to higher education]
are determined by law.”73 Within weeks, 112 members of the opposition party petitioned the
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Constitutional Court to annul the new law.74 The Court found that although the law was
written in general terms without referencing hijab, based on legislative discussions on the
law and the fact that the law was casually referred to as “Turban Yasasi (hijab law)” by the
mass media, its actual and sole aim was to lift the ban on religious attire and specifically
hijab in universities. In annulling the law, the Court referenced its above-discussed earlier
decisions on hijab and reiterated that religious coverings cannot be reconciled with a secular
state as understood in the Turkish Constitution based on Kemalist reforms. The Court
further found that religious symbols like hijab might violate human rights of others by
imposing religious views and even constituting religious coercion. The Court also relied on
ECHR opinions in the Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Dahlab v. Switzerland, and Refah Partisi v.
Turkey cases and stated that even an international human rights court agreed that hijab
prohibition did not violate human rights.75
In the September 2010 referendum, 57.88% of the Turkish citizenry approved various
amendments to the Turkish Constitution, with 42.12% rejecting them.76 Among the changes
that will be realized as a result of the amendments are the creation of an individual right to
petition the Constitutional Court77 and the right to appeal military court decisions to civilian
courts. These changes might hold positive improvements for Turkish women who seek a place
in the public sphere without sacrificing their beliefs. In fact, the Chair of Higher Education
Committee, Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, has already indicated that universities should not prevent
female students from entering school premises simply because of hijab. His permissive
statements have led to various universities relaxing the ban. Today, the hijab ban is enforced
by some universities only.78 With AKP’s recent win at national election in June 2011, the
headscarf ban is certain to remain a topic of political battles in Turkey.

Elsewhere in the World…
Turkey is not the only Muslim-majority country with laws prohibiting hijab in schools and
other public spaces. Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Albania and Kosovo also prohibit hijab for grade and
high school students. Syria and Egypt ban veils that cover faces from educational institutions.
Countries where Muslims are a minority have varying laws regarding the regulation of
hijab and veils. An increasing number of Western European jurisdictions are implementing
laws that prohibit hijab in schools for students and/or teachers, while others are targeting
face-covering veils by recent laws that prohibit them in all public spaces. Invariably, the
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reasons cited for the laws involve the democratic secular characteristic of these societies, and
the inherent gender inequality symbolized by both the hijab and veils. In the face of criticism
that these prohibitive laws are products of xenophobia, sectarianism, Islamophobia and
racism (which is alive and well in Western Europe), often the response is that hijab and veils
are mandates of a religious understanding that deems women’s sexuality suspect, thus
seeking to cover women, in turn demeaning them. Such gender discrimination has no place in
secular democracy, and must thus be regulated. This logic, never fully explained, without
actual proof that revealed hair is somehow more significant to a woman’s liberation and
freedom than other parts of her body, or proof that there is a correlation between revealing
flesh and intellectual freedom, has been accepted as Truth not just by those advocating for
State-enforced prohibition, but also by the courts — domestic and international.
Another theme that runs through Western European hijab debates is that of assimilation.
In a rather fascistic spirit, prohibitive laws are justified as effective mechanisms to ensure
that immigrant populations (i.e., outsiders) assimilate to secular democratic Western
European societies. How forcing a girl or a woman to reveal her hair might change their
presumed views on society generally and gender equality specifically remains unclear.
Regardless, assimilation to secular democracy remains another primary argument frequently
made by proponents of prohibitive laws and accepted by many a court.

Part III: Hijab as an International Human Right (?)
Ideally international law is the ultimate law that would safeguard human dignity and
ensure that a global order is established for all the members of the world community.
However, in its current Westphalian form, with sovereign nation states as the primary
legitimate actors, it fails to meet the challenge of being the law for all. Prohibition placed on
women’s bodies, presented as a necessity of a world with globalization, globalized and
globalizing values remain contradictory to the ideal of international law that claims to
safeguard the dignity of all. Perhaps an initial critique must begin with questioning whether
globalization is in fact a reality, in that whether the concept of globalization has done what it
claims, whether it has brought more of the world into a state of similar existence that goes
beyond listening to the same songs and watching the same Hollywood stars via teletechnology. Perhaps, as Jacques Derrida stated in a 2003 interview, “globalization hasn’t
occurred. It is a false concept, often an alibi; never has the world been so unequal and so
marginally shareable or shared.”79 As Derrida argued, the rise in the number of hijab
prohibitive laws (as well as hijab mandating laws in Muslim majority contexts), coinciding
with a global rise in right-wing movements, constitutes a stark sign that the world has a long
way to go before the magical egalitarianism liberal democracy and globalization promise is in
fact realized. Such realization “will occur only through the creation of a new international
law,”80 with new understandings of the differences that constitute the global community.81
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For instance, the hijab prohibitive discourses ignore rather significant questions: why is it
only Muslim women who seek to participate in public space while covering their hair and
even their faces? Where are the other religious conservative women whose religious systems
traditionally place them in the home only? Is there something subversive and even womanempowering about a covered woman participating in life outside the home, when traditional
Islamic law has mandated that women stay in the home?
As the cases below indicate, current prohibitive discourses fail to consider these very
important questions, which challenge the truth of the covered Muslim woman as weak and
oppressed. Only with advances in urbanization, space for more groups of citizens, women of
various socio-political and economic backgrounds are seeking to participate in public space.
For example, there are no Amish women who sue to cover their hair while teaching in public
schools, or Amish girl children seeking to cover their hair in public schools, because the
Amish traditionally do not participate in public space. The denials of these complexities in
turn deny covered Muslim women their subversive effect in both Muslim communities and
secular democratic society at large.82 This is further evidenced by the fact that the primary
spaces in which the hijab debates arise are schools and workplaces. This is also evident from
the brief discussion by the Sahin court—headscarves for pupils are prohibited primarily in
Muslim majority contexts (Turkey, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Kosovo). Another point of
complexity left unrecognized in current debates is the State’s utilization of the female body to
define the meaning of citizenship and national identity.

ECHR Decides
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of Muslim
headscarves in public space has been consistent and coherent. Unfortunately, the ECHR has
consistently and persistently found that the Muslim headscarf is inherently a sign of gender
discrimination and that its presence in public spaces may reasonably be interpreted as posing
a threat to secular and democratic principles as well as public peace and safety. As a
signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the Convention), Turkey has been before the ECHR a number of times to face
challenges to its hijab prohibitive laws. Although the ECHR refused the hear earlier cases, its
2005 decision in Sahin v. Turkey stands as the primary case by an international tribunal
upholding hijab bans in the name of protecting secular liberal democracy.
Article 9 of the Convention is the primary article guaranteeing religious freedom. Under
the article, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,”83 but this
right is subject to “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a

82.

83.

66

For a similar argument, see Accommodation Tangles in the Laws About Hair, in LAW AND RELIGION:
CASES IN CONTEXT (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010) (discussing two cases from the United States where
state and federal courts have upheld hijab prohibitions: Freeman v. Dept. of Highway Safety &
Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) and Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d
256 (3d Cir. 2009). Along with Jeffrey M. Pollock, I represented Ms. Webb in her appeal seeking her
right to wear her religious head-covering under her police uniform hat.
European Convention on Human Rights accessible in English at http://www.echr.coe.int/
NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf

Global Tangles: Laws, Headcoverings and Religious Identity

democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”84
Though at first glance the provision is logical and appears to include the necessary
flexibility for fringe scenarios where a religion might require actual harm to others, in
application, it has been interpreted to uphold hijab bans as necessary in secular liberal
democracies.
As early as 1993, in Karaduman v. Turkey, a committee of the ECHR reviewing the
admissibility of a complaint by a Turkish university student held that a secular university
could ban hijabs and deny services to students who refuse to reveal their hair and that such
policy was not in violation of Article 9.. The committee found the complaint inadmissible on
procedural grounds, but as to the Article 9 complaint, it stated that “having regard to the
requirements of a secular university System, that regulating students' dress and refusing
them administrative services, such as the issue of a degree certificate, for as long as they fail
to comply with such regulations does not, as such, constitute an interference with freedom of
religion and conscience.”85
In 2001, Lucia Dahlab, a Swiss teacher, petitioned the ECHR challenging the hijab ban in
Switzerland. Dahlab was a convert to Islam and wanted to continue to teach while wearing
hijab.86 The Swiss government claimed that “the Islamic headscarf was a powerful religious
symbol” but did not explain just what made the hijab a “powerful” religious symbol as
opposed to a weak one. Nor did the Swiss government discuss the presence of other religious
symbols. The ECHR accepted the Swiss government’s arguments. It stated that hijab
appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which . . .
is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for
others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic
society must convey to their pupils.

Consequently, the ECHR concluded that the hijab prohibition imposed on teachers was
necessary in a democratic society, thus satisfying the terms of Article 9.
Two years later, the ECHR upheld TCC’s dissolution of a political party, Refah Partisi, on
the grounds that it had violated the principle of secularism.87 Refah Partisi argued that the
dissolution decision violated the Convention Articles 10 and 11, protecting freedoms of
expression and assembly, respectively.88 TCC had dissolved Refah accepting allegations that
the party had become a center of anti-secular activities, aspiring to a religiously governed
Turkey instead. At the center of the allegations and TCC’s reasoning were instances of Refah
parliamentarians expressing their disagreement with the hijab ban. Accepting TCC’s
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reasoning, the ECHR based its decision on the general incompatibility of an Islam-based
politico-legal system and democracy. Since members of Refah had clearly expressed a longing
for a legal system with no hijab ban, no anti-polygamy laws, and even a possible plurality of
personal laws based on religion, the ECHR had ample evidence that Refah’s dissolution was
necessary to safeguard democracy, despite the fact that neither Refah nor its members had
actually undertaken any particular act besides giving speeches and participating in rallies
supporting various causes, including the lifting of the hijab ban. Although this case is
primarily about party dissolution, it reflects ECHR’s general bias against Islam as a religion
of inequity. In its references to the hijab ban, the ECHR simply cites to the Karaduman
decision to reiterate that universities can enforce hijab bans without violating religious
freedom under the Convention. In this case, the ECHR made clear that Islam as a religion
itself might constitute a threat to democracy, as simply believing in Islam and wishing for a
politico-legal system where Islamic symbols and institutions are not prohibited could be
proxies for “Islamic fundamentalism.”89
In concluding that the TCC had decided properly, the ECHR cited to its precedent to
emphasize “the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organizer of the religious harmony
and tolerance in a democratic society,” and that “the State’s duty of neutrality and
impartiality is incompatible with any power in the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of
religious beliefs.” Ironically, that is exactly what the TCC had done in dissolving Refah and
that is also exactly what the ECHR did in finding no violation of the Convention.
ECHR’s view of any belief in Islam as a potential proxy for Islamic fundamentalism is also
clear in the Sahin v. Turkey decision.90 Leyla Sahin, a medical student, had attended medical
school while in hijab. After the university administration issued a regulation banning hijab,
Sahin was denied access to her examinations and prevented from further enrolling in classes.
The university administration then brought disciplinary charges against her for refusing to
remove the headscarf and attending protests regarding the hijab ban. Sahin enrolled in
medical school at Vienna University and petitioned the ECHR alleging violations of Article 9
among other provisions of the Convention. The ECHR found that the hijab ban in universities
violated Sahin’s freedom of religion under Article 9(1), but that the Turkish State’s purpose of
“protecting rights and freedoms of others and [] public order” was a legitimate purpose
necessary in a democratic society, thus constituting a valid exception under Article 9(2).
Citing to its earlier decisions in Karaduman, Dahlab and Refah, the ECHR again referred to
the inherent function of “the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise

89. Although he concurred in the outcome, Judge Kovler expressed concern over the Court’s hasty
conclusions about Islam:
What bothers me about some of the Court’s findings is that in places they are unmodulated,
especially as regards the extremely sensitive issues raised by religion and its values. I would
prefer an international court to avoid terms borrowed from politico-ideological discourse,
such as “Islamic fundamentalism” (para. 94 of the judgment), “totalitarian movements”
(para. 99 of the judgment), “threat to democratic regime” (para. 107 of the judgment), etc.,
whose connotations in the context of the present case, might be too forceful.
90.
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of various religions, faiths, beliefs” and that “this role is conducive to public order, religious
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society.”91
Quoting directly from the Grand Chamber’s decision below, the ECHR further noted “the
emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on the protection of the rights of
women . . . Gender equality—recognized by the European Court as one of the key principles
underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of
Europe.” A further quote from the Grand Chamber’s decision comments that Turkey is a
“country in which the majority of the population, while professing a strong attachment to the
rights of women and a secular way of life, adhere to the Islamic faith.” Thus, if some women
are allowed to cover their hair in public spaces like universities, then those who choose not to
cover might feel pressure or even coerced to eventually cover their hair. In other words,
Sahin’s claim that the Turkish state has interfered with her religious freedom must first and
foremost be analyzed not in terms of how she is affected, but in terms of how others might be
affected if certain hypothetical concerns materialize.
A later petition to the ECHR came from Sabire Kose and numerous other secondary school
pupils at state-funded religious schools, as well as their parents.92 The pupils, female
students wearing hijab, were denied access to school grounds unless they removed their
hijabs. The petitioners alleged a violation of Article 9 among other provisions of the
Convention. They argued that the hijab ban violated Article 14 of the Convention prohibiting
discrimination on basis of religion and sex. They alleged that the ban targeted only practicing
Muslims and thus constituted religious discrimination. They also alleged that the ban
constituted sex discrimination because “Muslim boys were able to study in State schools
without being subjected to any form of ban.”93 In its review of the Article 9 complaint, the
ECHR simply referred to its holding in Sahin and thus concluded that the hijab ban issue
had been settled, and bringing a settled issue before the ECHR violated admissibility criteria
as manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 (3) of the Convention. The ECHR rejected the
Article 14 discrimination claim also as manifestly ill-founded, stating that dress code
requirements in schools had the manifest purpose to “preserve neutrality and secularism
within schools – thus protecting adolescents at an age when they are impressionable – and to
protect the interests of the education system.”94
The ECHR’s most recent decisions regarding a hijab ban were Dogru v. France and
Kervanci v. France, decided on the same day.95 Both Belgin Dogru and Esma-Nur Kervanci
were French school children who wanted to wear a hijab while attending physical education
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classes. Employing similar reasoning as in Sahin, the ECHR found that the French state
could limit the children’s religious practice as necessary in a democratic society. Discussing
the particular nature of French society and French secularism, laicite, the ECHR concluded
that the French law had the legitimate aim of “protecting the rights and freedoms of others,
public order and public safety.”96 The ECHR also incorporated from Dahlab its understanding
of hijab as an inherent symbol of gender inequality.97 As a result, the hijab ban is a mere
consequence of secular school regulations requiring certain limitations on attire, and not
meant to target Muslim school children.

Making Sense of It?
The above cases share a few common themes in interpreting the scope of Article 9 freedom
of religion as it extends to hijab. First, inherent in the ECHR’s reasoning and explicit in its
explanations is the idea of a State that is neutral and impartial. This impartial and neutral
State is explicitly referenced in all the cases, in explaining why certain restrictions on
religious freedom might be necessary in the eyes of an impartial and neutral State that is
charged with safeguarding the rights of the many with diverse views and beliefs. How the
State, which is presumably secular, is neutral and impartial is unexplained. Moreover, the
concepts of impartiality and neutrality are used uncritically, with a presumption that one
who knows secular democracy must understand that the State will be neutral and impartial.
This philosophical immaturity in thinking that the State is a neutral entity robs the ECHR of
its legitimacy as the presumed protector of human dignity and the guardian of rights so
precious to those singled out by the law. A state is born of an ideology as evidenced in the
respective Constitution that gives it life. For instance, the Dogru court points out that France,
Turkey and Switzerland are states where “secularism is a constitutional principle.” Thus, by
definition, the State in these countries is not neutral or impartial. Clearly the ECHR uses a
short hand to imply that the State in a secular democracy may not favor one religious group
over another, and at times must act as the mediator between various groups. The State as a
political entity, however, constituted of individuals elected through political processes, is not
the kind of neutral and impartial entity of which the ECHR speaks. As is evident in the hijab
cases before the ECHR, the State acts with partial (for revealed hair as the norm), prejudiced
(against Islam and Islamic symbols) and very much political might.
A second theme in the ECHR’s decisions is that of an Islam that is inherently a threat to
secular democracy. Hijab worn by individual girls and women is equated with Islam as a
political force, which in turn is equated with a threat referred to as Islamic
fundamentalism—never clearly defined, never clearly confronted, but just alluded to and all
those instances of implications to its dangers unquestioningly accepted by the ECHR.
A third theme is that of gender equality as an inherent part of secular democracy and
hijab as inherently contradictory to gender equality. The ECHR does not expand on this
theme but explicitly states in the cases, as if it should be obvious to those who know secular
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democracy, that if a woman covers her hair out of religious conviction, that religion must be
one of gender inequity. There is never any discussion as to why covered hair is inherently
different than other covered body parts, or why hair covered for religious purposes is
inherently different than hair covered for other reasons, such as recovery from chemotherapy,
or protection from cold. The ECHR presumes that there can only be one definition of gender
equity, and to be gender equal, all citizens in all secular democracies must share a uniform
understanding of gender equity which is then implemented in the same way by secular
democratic States. Perhaps the ECHR should heed Janet Halley’s suggestion and take a
break from feminism, as it understands it, and let individual girls and women define for
themselves how to constitute dignity in their lives. The ECHR’s idea of gender equality robs
the hijab wearing girls and women of any meaningful choice of control over their bodies.
Ironically this theft is in the name of protecting these women from the coercive forces in their
Muslim families and communities, not to mention their religion. Accepting that there are
instances of such coercion in families and communities over issues as diverse as
headcoverings, gender identity, or political opinion, how State coercion is preferable to
familial or societal coercion is unclear.
In her dissent in the Sahin case, Judge Tulkens points out Leyla Sahin wore the hijab of
her own free will, and that there is no reason to doubt her statement. Judge Tulkens fails
to see how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from following a
practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be taken to have freely
adopted. Equality and non-discrimination are subjective rights, which must remain under
the control of those who are entitled to benefit from them.98

As Judge Tulkens correctly identifies, the ECHR affirms State paternalism in determining
how a gender equal woman behaves and what she looks like, in the meantime building
barriers to girls’ and women’s access to education, as well as a variety of other jobs.
Yet another problematic theme that runs throughout the ECHR’s hijab jurisprudence is
that hijab is a political and religious symbol and not just an individual choice based on belief
and faith. As such, it is “a powerful religious symbol”99 which can be suggestively coercive and
make those around it uncomfortable. It threatens public order. The challenges to hijab bans
are no longer about the rights of the individual women asserting them, but rather about the
rights of those who do not cover their hair. Even presuming the State could be neutral and
impartial, the ECHR’s reasoning that shifts the benefit of an individual right (religious
freedom) to those who already have it renders the State partial to upholding and enforcing an
already established norm. This is problematic in a context like Turkey where the norms have
been created primarily through a top-down process with ongoing resistance from various
sections of the masses. It is also problematic in contexts where Muslims are religious
minorities and the discourses around hijab are necessarily diluted by other ideological
undercurrents such as xenophobia and racism.
From the absurdity of trivial events that took place in Turkey to eliminate the headscarf
from the public eye (some of which are recounted in Part II of this paper) to the overt failure
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of an international judical body to recognize its own bias against a religion, the Muslim
woman’s headscarf has done much more than one could imagine a few centuries ago.
Although there are undeniable instances of Muslim women and girls being coerced and forced
to cover their hair and their bodies, the way to battle such coercion cannot be through
approval and advocacy of state coercion to uncover Muslim women’s hair and bodies. In the
end, the law must do more than prohibit and punish—in fact, international human rights law
claims to protect and ensure dignity of all individuals. In the case of the Muslim woman’s
headcoverings, however, international law has failed to live up to its ideals. Once again
remembering Derrida’s sentiment, an egalitarian world will not be a viable dream until the
“creation of a new international law”100 that recognizes the complexities of the human being,
of identity, of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the workings of Power and norm-creation.
That international human rights discourse has generally accepted the undesirableness of
covered hair, and it has done so at a time when Muslims and Islam continue to be the global
evils, shows that we are far from Derrida’s imagined global community.

100. CHÉRIF, supra note 79.
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